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n this paper I will focus on two 
questions that people in general, and 
philosophers in particular, generally 
refuse to take seriously: Why is it 
morally wrong to kill people for trivial 
reasons (e.g., to barbecue them), and why is it 
morally permissible to kill animals (Le., non-
human animals) for trivial reasons? I will not 
attempt to answer these questions; rather, my 
interest is in why it is that so many people refuse 
to take them seriously. I will argue that when it 
comes to developing an "ethics of eating," the 
stomach all too often triumphs over the mind. 
PHILOSOPHY 
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1. Two Modest Proposals 
When I teach introductory ethics, I like to 
befuddle my students by proposing a business 
venture. I tell them that I have learned of the 
existence of the Millionaire Gourmets' Club, 
which is willing to spend vast sums of money 
to obtain nice fat babies to roast. I suggest 
that we try to profit from my discovery by 
starting a baby-ranching business. What we 
would do is find women who, for money, are 
willing to become impregnated by paid sperm 
donors. Both the women and the sperm 
donors would be fully informed about our 
plans. Any babies produced would be placed 
on our baby ranch; there we would fatten 
them, slaughter them ("slaughter" is such an 
ugly word; perhaps we should instead say that 
we would "harvest" them), and then sell the 
carcasses (whoops, another ugly word) to the 
Millionaire Gourmets' Club. 
My students, needless to say, are shocked by 
my proposal. They tell me that my baby-
ranching venture would be nothing more 
than an institutionalized form of murder. 
They tell me that they would have no part in 
such a venture - and they often add that the 
whole idea is, to use their terminology, "gross 
and disgusting." 
What my students are objecting to is the 
active cannibalism that my baby-ranching 
plan would involve - active because the 
people eaten are killed so that they can be 
eaten. As it so happens, my students are also 
opposed to passive cannibalism, which 
involves, for example, eating people who 
died natural deaths. 
My students' aversion to passive cannibal-
ism becomes apparent when I propose a 
second business venture to them. I point out 
that in many countries people are starving to 
death and that in even more countries people 
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have insufficient protein in their diets. I 
suggest that we remedy this situation - and 
make a profit at the same time - by acquir-
ing the bodies of people who died natural 
deaths and selling the meat abroad. (We 
might gain a "property right" to someone's 
body by paying him today for the use of his 
body when he dies.) I point out that it is 
shamefully wasteful to dispose of corpses the 
way we now do - namely, by contaminating 
them with embalming fluid and then burying 
them in the ground. 
My students, on hearing this proposal, some-
times object that the meat of a dead person 
would be unsafe to eat, inasmuch as it might be 
contaminated with germs, the very germs that 
killed the person in question. In reply to this 
claim, I have three things to say. First, I point 
out that we could be selective about which 
corpses we sold; we could, for example, special-
ize in the relatively germ-free bodies of people 
who had died of heart attacks. Second, even if 
a corpse had some germs, most of these would 
be killed by cooking the corpse. Third, even if 
we sold corpses that could not be disinfected by 
cooking, we still might be justified in selling 
them: for the starving people in many parts of 
the world, tainted meat is better than no food 
at all. 
Another common objection against passive 
cannibalism is that practicing it will, in the 
long run, tend to reduce our respect for our 
fellow humans and will thereby make it more 
likely that we will violate the rights of our 
fellows.! In reply to this objection I point out 
that there are documented cases in which 
people have practiced passive cannibalism for 
generations and have nevertheless main-
tained their respect for their fellow humans.2 
And even if it were possible that the practice 
of passive cannibalism would lessen our 
respect for our fellow, isn't this potential evil 
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outweighed by the actual evil that results 
from our burying perfectly good meat and 
thereby condemning distant peoples to death 
by starvation? 
My students are not alone in their aversion 
to cannibalism. In our culture people in 
general feel a strong enough aversion to have 
made cannibalism a serious crime. In Ohio 
(where I now reside) the law does not mention 
cannibalism as such. One can nevertheless 
draw the conclusion that active cannibalism is 
illegal inasmuch as it involves murder, and one 
suspects that passive cannibalism is also illegal, 
inasmuch as it involves abuse of a corpse. 
According to Ohio law, it is a fourth-degree 
felony to "treat a human corpse in a way that 
would outrage reasonable community sensibili-
ties."3 Judging from my students' reaction, 
people in my community do not look fondly 
on acts of passive cannibalism. 
When we tum our attention to other cul-
tures, even "primitive" ones, we find that 
they, too, are generally opposed to cannibal-
ism in either of its forms. And even before the 
spread of Christianity the practice of canni-
balism was rare.4As taboos go, the cannibal-
ism taboo would seem to put the incest taboo 
to shame. 
To be sure, the law and people in general 
distinguish between what might be termed 
recreational and non-recreational cannibal-
ism. There is, many would claim, an impor-
tant moral difference between eating a dead 
person simply to have a novel culinary experi-
ence and eating a dead person to avoid starva-
tion. Various members of the Donner party, 
for example, resorted to non-recreational 
passive cannibalism when confronted with 
starvation; they were subsequently forgiven-
at least in the eyes of the law. It was only 
when active cannibalism was suspected that 
legal action was even threatened.5 
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It is interesting to note, though, that even 
though the public in some sense forgives acts 
of non-recreational passive cannibalism, it 
simultaneously finds these acts horrible. So 
strong is our aversion to cannibalism - even 
to non-recreational passive cannibalism -
that there have been many people who have 
chosen to die rather than eat human flesh, 
and many of those who have avoided death by 
resorting to passive cannibalism have typical-
ly suffered greatly before doing so. They pre-
ferred to eat a shoe - or at least try to -
than eat human flesh. 
Although people are generally opposed to 
eating people, they rarely (in our culture, at 
any rate) share the same qualms about eating 
animals. To be sure, people have pronounced 
likes and dislikes concerning animal flesh. 
Although beef, pork, and chicken are popular 
with Americans, relatively few of them will 
eat frogs, rabbits, dogs, cats, or horses. Never-
theless, they tend not to make a moral issue 
out of their dislikes. As far as I can tell, in 
much of America you can eat anything you 
want as long as it isn't a fellow human being. 
There are laws against cruelty to animals, but 
the law says surprisingly little about the uses 
to which dead animals can be put. 
By way of illustration, in Ohio there are 
laws dealing with the consumption of "higher 
animals" (e.g., dogs and horses) by people; 
these laws, however, are intended not so 
much to prevent these higher animals from 
being consumed as to prevent people from 
unwittingly being sold or served the flesh of a 
higher animal when they think they are 
eating, say, beef. Thus, the state of Ohio 
requires any establishment serving horse meat 
to post in a conspicuous place a sign, "which 
shall be white and not less than twelve by 
eighteen inches in size, upon which shall be 
printed in plain black Roman letters, ... 
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'Horse Meat Served Here'" 6 In Ohio it isn't a 
crime to sell horse meat or to eat it; the crime 
is in passing off horse meat as some other kind 
of animal flesh. 
2. Cows and People 
It is fairly clear, then, that in America and 
. in much of the world a human corpse is more 
of a sacred thing than is a living cow: to 
defile a corpse - which of course is inca-
pable of suffering - is a far greater crime 
than is causing a cow significant discomfort 
and suffering simply so that one can enjoy a 
Big Mac.7 
This raises an important question: is there 
really that much difference between people 
and cows that you can kill and eat cows and 
(most Americans would claim) raise no 
important moral issues, but that you can't eat 
people (even ones who have died natural 
deaths) without committing acts of moral 
depravity? 
We have now reached the heart of the 
issue: are there important (Le., morally sig-
nificant) differences between cows and 
people? And if so, what are they? Unless we 
are able to point out· such differences, then it 
would seem that we are inconsistent when 
we hold - as people typically do - that it is 
morally permissible to eat cows but not 
people. If we wish to be consistent, we would 
have to hold either (i) that both eating cows 
and eating people are morally permissible or 
(ii) that neither eating cows nor eating people 
is morally permissible. If we choose the 
second alternative, we end up - if we are 
moral people, at any rate - as vegetarians, 
and if we choose the first alternative, we 
must drop our objections to cannibalism, 
passive or otherwise. 
My students feel confident that they can 
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explain (even to someone as apparently dense 
as their instructor) the difference between 
cows and people - Le., the difference that 
allows us to say that cattle ranching is morally 
permissible but that baby ranching is not. 
Here are some of the explanations they typi-
cally offer, together with the reason why these 
explanations are unacceptable. 
(1) Caws don't mind being killed - or at any 
rate, they don't protest when we kill them. This 
answer won't do, though, since the babies 
involved in my baby-ranching scheme are 
unlikely to protest when we kill them. Con-
sequently, this "difference" isn't a difference 
at all. 
(2) We kill cows in a painless way. One 
wonders whether this is true, but even it if 
were, it won't do as an answer. Notice after 
all, that the babies in my baby-ranching 
scheme will be killed in a painless way. So 
again, the alleged difference is not really a 
difference. 
I t is fairly clear, then, that in America and in much of 
the world a human corpse is 
more of a sacred thing than is a 
living cow: to defile a corpse is 
a far greater crime than is 
causing a cow significant dis.. 
comfort and suffering simply so 
that one can enjoy a Big Mac. 
(3) We raise the cows just so we can eat them, 
and since we bring the cows inw existence, we 
have the right w end their lives as we see fit. 
Again, this answer won't do sirwe in my baby-
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ranching scheme we are bringing the babies 
into existence that we eventually "harvest." 
We "made" these babies; few would go on to 
infer, however, that this gives us the right to 
kill and eat them. 
(4) People have souls; cows don't. The basic 
problem with this response is that souls are 
not observable, so the claim made does not 
appear to be one that we can test empirically. 
And although one can accept the above 
claim as a "leap of faith," it is a leap that 
many people are unwilling to take. 
(5) People have a right to life; cows don't. 
This is a terrific response but for one thing: 
it begs the question. What I am asking, after 
all, is this: what difference is there between 
people and cows that gives people but not 
cows a right to life? The answer to my ques-
tions cannot be that people have a right to 
life but cows don't. 
(6) People are capable of rational thought; 
cows are not. This answer, by the way, is the 
one that many philosophers (including, I 
think, Kant) will give. 
I agree that people do have a greater 
capacity for rational thought than cows. 
(What I mean to say, of course, is that most 
people have a greater capacity for rational 
thought than most cows.) The problem is 
that I don't agree that this difference is an 
impcrrtant difference - or at least not one 
important enough to account for the dispari-
ty between our views on the moral accept-
ability of eating people and our views on the 
moral acceptability of eating cows. 
Why is capacity for rational thought such 
an important thing? One answer that is com-
monly given to this question is that capacity 
for rational thought is valuable and impor-
tant because it lets us do valuable and impor-
tant things. What things? Well, things 
animals can't do, like manufacture automo-
Winter 1989 
biles, build bridges, paint pictures, program 
computers, and write philosophy papers. 
The problem with this line of response is 
that it just pushes our inquiry back one step. 
Now we must ask why the abilities just 
described are so important - and in what 
sense they are important. 
If it be answered, as it often will, that 
these abilities are important because they 
enable us to advance our interests (life is 
easier if you can drive across a bridge instead 
of having to swim across a river), the narcis-
sism of our value system becomes apparent: 
to sayan action is good is to say it is good for 
people.s It also becomes apparent how con-
venient this line of response is for us as a 
species. 
A cynic might, at this point, suggest that 
what we have done in selecting the capacity 
for rational thought as the thing that distin-
guishes us from the other animals is to 
demonstrate our superiority over the other 
animals by choosing an ability that we have 
and they lack and by saying that this ability is 
the one that matters. Why are we so great? 
Because we are like we are. Why are the 
other animals morally insignificant? Because 
they are unlike us. 
There are, to be sure, other ways to answer 
the questions, "Why is rational thought so 
important?" I will not take time to describe 
these answers; I will, however, point out that 
any such answer must not only presuppose a 
value system but presumably a value system 
that is "biased" in favor of the interests of 
human beings. Before one can point to a dif-
ference between cows and people as being 
ethically significant, one must already have 
ethical values. For this reason, our attempt 
to point out the ethically significant differ-
ence between people and cows raises more 
questions than it answers. 
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I, for one, suspect that the differences 
between people and cows are not that great 
- and certainly not great enough to justify 
the disparity between our moral views con-
cerning people and our moral views concern-
ing cows. Unless we assume that people are 
terrific and cows aren't, I doubt that we will 
ever be able to prove as much. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Some might, at this point, wonder whether 
the above remarks constitute an ethical argu-
ment for vegetarianism - or at least show 
that the ethical beliefs of the vegetarian are 
more consistent than those of the non-vege-
tarian. I wish they did, but I fear they do not. 
Notice, once again, that from the view that 
there are no important differences between 
people and cows, it does not follow that vege-
tarianism is morally obligatory. What does 
follow, as was mentioned above, is one of two 
things: either vegetarianism is morally obliga-
tory, ar cannibalism is morally permissible. It 
will take funher argument to establish one of 
these disjuncts as the correct view. 
Another thing to realize is that in the 
same way as a non-vegetarian might be guilty 
of inconsistency when she refuses to engage 
in cannibalism (passive or otherwise), a veg-
etarian might also be guilty of inconsistency 
when she refuses to eat the meat of an 
animal who lived a "natural life" and died a 
"natural death." 
Suppose, then, that some animal has lived a 
natural life and died a natural death. As a 
result we find ourselves with a body to dispose 
of. We can eat it, or we can feed it to carnivo-
rous animals, or we can bury it. What I want 
to suggest is that in a world with starving 
people - and starving animals, for that matter 
- it makes little sense to waste this food by 
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burying it. If we value the lives of people and 
animals, shouldn't we in these cases advocate 
the consumption of animal flesh? 
Indeed, I know of one author who argues 
that we are guilty of waste when we bury the 
millions of dogs and cats we annually destroy.9 
This author would, of course, prefer that we 
not destroy these animals, but once we have 
destroyed them, does it make sense to dispose 
of their meat as if it were so much garbage? 
In short, the hard-core vegetarian who 
declares that it is never morally permissible to 
consume animal flesh might be guilty of 
inconsistency. Of course, few vegetarians are 
"hard core" in the sense intended. 
If what I have said in this paper is correct, 
many people have an inconsistent "ethics of 
eating." Why the inconsistency? Because, I 
think, they have allowed their stomachs to 
triumph over their minds. Our food preju-
dices are so strong that we will typically 
reject any ethical system that disagrees with 
them - even though doing so means falling 
into inconsistency. 
Although they would typically be reluc-
tant to admit it, many grown-up philoso-
phers have a hard time reasoning their way 
around their upbringing. Someone raised on 
Big Macs might, on obtaining his philosophy 
Ph.D., find it easy to prove that cows lack a 
right to life. At the same time, though, one 
can imagine that if his culture had been dif-
ferent - if, for example, this philosopher 
had been raised to think of cows as sacred -
he would, as an adult, be able to invent any 
number of arguments to show that both cows 
and people have rights. Similarly, if human 
physiology required us to engage periodically 
in cannibalistic acts to remain healthy, our 
ethicists would probably come up with per-
suasive arguments in favor of cannibalism. 
Am I suggesting, then, that much of moral 
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philosophy is little more than an attempt to 
"rationalize" our moral intuitions? Indeed I 
am. I strongly suspect that our ethical "gut 
feelings" - about murder, about cannibalism, 
about the value of human life in general-
are the "data" against which we test ethical 
theories. When an ethical theory doesn't 
properly "account for" our favored set of 
ethical data (Le., our ethical "gut feelings"), 
we reject the theory. It can also happen that 
we discard ethical data in light of an ethical 
theory, but this is much less common. 
I suspect that some of my readers have 
found this a disgusting paper, a paper not to 
read before mealtime. I apologize for this, but 
at the same time I urge my readers to examine 
their feelings of disgust and to ask whether 
these feelings have had any significant'influ-
ence on their ethical views. And to those of 
you who have been led to vegetarianism by 
ethical arguments, let me offer a piece of 
advice: your real job is not so much to per-
suade the minds of carnivores as to persuade 
their stomachs. Where their stomachs go, 
their minds will surely follow. 
Carol Belanger Grafton, 
Old-Fashioned Animal Cuts. 
New York: Dover, 1987 
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